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Abstract
We study decentralized mechanisms for allocating rms into search pools. The
pools are created in response to noisy preference signals provided by consumers, who
then browse the pools via costly random sequential search. Surplus-maximizing search
pools are implementable in symmetric Nash equilibrium. Full extraction of the maxi-
mal surplus is implementable if and only if the distribution of consumer types satises
a set of simple inequalities, which involve the relative fractions of consumers who like
di¤erent products and the Bhattacharyya coe¢ cient of similarity between their condi-
tional signal distributions. The optimal mechanism can be simulated by a keyword
auctionwith broad matching. (JEL D02, D47, D82).
Consider a consumer who has a certain need and looks for a product that will satisfy
it. When confronted with a particular product, the consumer can identify whether he wants
it. However, when he rst embarks on the search process, he is unable to provide an exact
description of his need, and can only submit an imprecise querythat ts several product
types. How should a benevolent planner react to the consumers query? If he gives the
consumer a single item, he risks ending up with a poor match. Instead, the planner may
provide the consumer with a set of options to browse. If search is time-consuming, the plan-
ner should design the set in order to balance two considerations: maximizing the probability
that the consumer will nd what he is looking for, and minimizing the amount of time it
will take him to nd it. In other words, the planners problem is to design the consumers
search environment.
The consumers predicament is prevalent in other environments. When an employer
approaches a Human Resource agency with an intention to hire a new worker, the most
he can usually do is list a few characteristics that vaguely describe the kind of worker he
is looking for. Likewise, when we look for a rental apartment through a real-estate agent,
we typically describe only broad characteristics (location, size, amenities). A more modern
example is online search, where users submit queries that often contain general and imprecise
keywords. Imagine that you look for a specic piece of instrumental music on YouTube, but
you forgot its name. You would recognize it instantaneously if you heard it, but the only
information you can supply to YouTube is the pieces genre. Finally, there are cases in which
the consumer passively conveys information. For instance, in contemporary online platforms,
the cookieson userscomputers describe their navigation history, which may be correlated
with their current needs.
We attempt to capture situations of this kind with a simple model, in which every
consumer is interested in only one type of product and can provide only one particular de-
scription or queryconcerning this product. Each product type is supplied by a continuum
of rms; and when the consumer is given a subset of rms, he browses it using the most
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basic search technology in the literature: random sequential search. In our model, a cen-
tral planner aims to associate with each query a search pool (an innite and typically
heterogeneous collection of rms) so as to maximize expected social welfare, dened by the
gross surplus created when consumers and suppliers transact minus the search costs that
consumers incur. An e¢ cient search pool is one in which it takes consumers little time on
average to nd what they want.
If consumers could provide a perfectly informative query, there would be no design
issue: when a consumer says he is interested in product type x, the planner will respond
with a homogenous search pool consisting of many suppliers of x. The design problem arises
when the consumers query is a noisy signal of his need. The planner could still reach his
objective if he could directly identify the type of product o¤ered by each supplier: the optimal
composition of product types in the search pool associated with each query is determined
by a simple rst-order condition that reects the preference distribution among consumers
who submitted the query.
The problem becomes economically interesting when the planner wishes to decentralize
the allocation of suppliers into search pools (because it is too costly for him to directly
verify product types, or because he wants to automatize the allocation procedure). In this
case the planner needs to make sure that suppliersassignment into search pools is aligned
with their incentives. This is an object-allocation problem, where the allocated objects are
unusual: entitlements to enter consumers search pools. A suppliers ultimate evaluation
of this allocation is a function of the joint distribution of consumersneeds and queries (as
well as the assignment of other suppliers). The incentive problem arises because consumers
queries are noisy signals of their needs, which encourages suppliers to present themselves as
relevant to many queries. In the absence of appropriate design, consumerssearch pools will
be ine¢ ciently composed, resulting in excessively prolonged search.
Our rst result is that as long as the planner has no budget constraints, there is a direct
(anonymous) mechanism that Nash implements the e¢ cient search pools for any underlying
2
joint distribution over consumers needs and queries. Next, we ask whether the planner
can design a direct mechanism that maximizes social surplus and fully extracts it. If the
planner were a perfect monopolist trying to maximize prots, this would be his rst-best
outcome. This objective turns out to be implementable if and only if every pair of product
types satises a simple inequality, which incorporates two quantities: the product types
relative popularity, and a conventional measure (known as the Bhattacharyya Coe¢ cient) of
the similarity between the query distributions that characterize consumers who look for these
two product types. As consumer preferences become more uniformly distributed and queries
become more Blackwell-informative of consumerspreferences, the perfect monopolists ob-
jective is more easily implementable. When it is implemented, the price per impression
that rms of any given type pay obeys a simple formula. These prices decrease with the
Blackwell informativeness of consumersqueries.
Can the optimal mechanism be mimicked by an indirect mechanism in which suppliers
engage in competitive bidding for the right to be included in search pools? In other words, can
some form of a competitive market implement e¢ cient search environments? We propose
an auction format in which each rm submits a bid-per-impression for one query of its
choice, and where the highest bidder for one query can enter with some probability into search
pools associated with other queries that it did not bid for. We refer to this last feature as
broad matching, hijacking search-engine jargon. Thus, when a consumer submits a query,
he receives a potentially mixed search pool that includes rms that bid for other queries.
We show that when the perfect monopolists objective is implementable, our broad-match
auction has an essentially unique symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, in which social
surplus is maximized and fully extracted. Furthermore, the optimal auction has a simple
specication of the broad match functionthat determines the probability with which the
highest bidders for a query enter the search pool associated with any given query.
Our notion of broad matching captures an intuitive function of real-life institutions that
match agents in two-sided markets. This function can be described as vocabulary expan-
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sion. When a prospective buyer looks up road bikesin a classied directory, he may see
items listed by sellers under racing bikes, hybrid bikesor xed gear bikes. Although
the buyer and seller used di¤erent terms, the directory bridges the gap between their vocab-
ularies in the interest of a potentially good match. Likewise, organiconline search engines
respond to keyword-based queries by taking into account typos and semantically related
terms. The broad-match function plays a similar role in our indirect mechanism.
The main contributions of this paper are thus threefold: formulating the problem of
decentralized implementation of e¢ cient search environments, elucidating the forces that
shape the relevant incentive constraints, and the novel broad-matching auction format. Al-
though this project has been inspired by modern online search engines, the model obviously
abstracts from some of their key features and therefore cannot be viewed as a faithful model
of this real-life institution. We do hope, however, that our abstraction will help researchers
conceptualize the problem of search design in various economic settings, which include
search engines, but - as we demonstrate in the concluding section - are not restricted to
them.
I. The environment
Let X be a nite set of product types, jXj  2. Let W be a nite set of signals, where
jW j  jXj. For every x 2 X, there is a measure one of rms that o¤er only this product
type (as many units as required, at zero cost). We sometimes refer to them as x rms. Each
rm is informed of its own type only. A rm gets a xed payo¤ of 1 from any unit it sells
(we abstract from product prices).1
On the other side of the market, there is a measure one of consumers. A consumer
type is dened by the pair (x;w), where x is the (only) type of product he is interested in,
and w is the signal he can convey about what he is looking for. In line with some of the
potential applications we have in mind, we often refer to w as a query, a keywordor
the consumers vocabulary. Let  2 (X W ) be the distribution of consumer types
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in the population. The marginals of  on X and W have full support. As usual, denote
(x) =
P
w (x;w) and ( j x) = ((w j x))w2W . The latter is referred to as the conditional
signal/query distribution that characterizes the preference type x.
When a consumer of type (x;w) consumes a product of type y 6= x, he gets a sure
payo¤ of 0. When he consumes a particular product of type x, he gets a payo¤ of  > 0
with independent probability  and a payo¤ of zero with probability 1  . The parameter 
captures idiosyncratic heterogeneity among consumers and rms of a given type. Products
are inspection goods: when a consumer encounters a particular product, he immediately
recognizes the payo¤ it generates. However, all he can communicate ex-ante about what he
is looking for is encapsulated in the signal w. Note that w does not represent the consumers
information about his own preferences, but the information he can provide to others. Thus,
when the consumer inspects a particular product, this does not cause him to revise his beliefs
about other products.
Consumers decide ex-ante, before their type is realized, whether to engage in search. If
a consumer opts out, he gets a payo¤ of zero. If a consumer decides to search, his type (x;w)
is subsequently realized and he automatically submits the signal/query w. He does not get
to revise his search decision in this interim stage. In response to his query, the consumer is
given access to an innite collection of products. We refer to this collection as the search pool
associated with w, and dene it formally as a probability distribution ((x j w))x2X , where
(x j w) is the fraction of products of type x in the pool. Denote  = (( j w))w2W . The
consumer repeatedly draws independent random samples from this pool (with replacement),
where each draw carries a xed cost c 2 (0; ). As soon as the consumer nds a product that
satises his need, he transacts with its seller and terminates his search. If (x j w) > 0, a
consumer of type (x;w) will nd what he wants in nite time with probability one (because
the pool contains innitely many products).
The consumers ex-ante participation decision maximizes his expected utility according
to "rational expectations". In fact, all we need to assume is that the consumers decision
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is based on a correct estimate of: (1) the probability he will nd a product that satises
his (yet to be realized) need; and (2) the expected duration of his search. These are broad
features of the overall quality of a search platform, and consumers can plausibly learn them
in the long run.
An example: Mozart vs. Stravinsky
The following specication illustrates the primitives of our model and serves as a running
example. Our consumer population consists of people who had a previous chance encounter
with some piece of classical music - while listening to the radio, watching a lm or attending
a public ceremony - and are now trying to retrieve it (di¤erent consumers are looking for
di¤erent pieces). Suppose that all relevant pieces have been composed by either Mozart or
Stravinsky. Accordingly, let X = fmoz; strg. The set of signals consists of three keywords,
Mozart, Stravinskyand Classical Music, denoted MOZ, STR and CL respectively.
A consumer type (moz;MOZ) ((str; STR)) is interpreted as someone who recognizes that
the piece he once heard was by Mozart (Stravinsky). In contrast, the types (moz;CL) and
(str; CL) are unable to describe the composer of the piece they are looking for, and all they
can say ex-ante is that they are looking for some piece of classical music. Each consumer
can recognize whether a particular music le he listens to is a rendition of the piece he is
looking for. However, the inspection never reveals the pieces composer, and consequently
the consumer is never able to revise his query. Assume (moz; STR) = (str;MOZ) = 0 -
that is, when a consumer can name the composer, he never makes an error.
Optimal search pools
Consider a central planner who aims to allocate rms into search pools in order to
maximize total surplus. Since consumers make their participation decisions before their
types are realized, we can assume that they either all participate or all opt out. Conditional
on participation, social surplus is given by the following function of the collection of search
pools :
U() 
X
(x;w)j(xjw)>0
(x;w)  (1 + ) 
X
(x;w)
(x;w)  c
  (x j w)
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It is clear from this expression that the planner will set (x j w) > 0 whenever (x;w) > 0, to
prevent a positive mass of consumers from incurring innite search costs. Thus, conditional
on participating, all consumers eventually nd what they want, such that rms earn a total
payo¤ of 1, consumers earn a total gross payo¤ of , and the expected search cost of a
consumer of type (x;w) is c=(x j w).
Dene  = arg max U(). This means that 
 minimizes consumersexpected search
duration. First-order conditions imply
(1)
(x j w)
(y j w) =
s
(x;w)
(y; w)
whenever (x;w)(y; w) > 0. Since
P
x2X 
(x j w) = 1, we obtain
(2) (x j w) =
p
(x;w)P
y2X
p
(y; w)
In the Mozart vs. Stravinskyexample, (str; STR) = (moz;MOZ) = 1, because
the signals MOZ and STR are perfectly informative of the consumers preferences. The
fraction of moz products in the search pool associated with the query CL is
(3) (moz;CL) =
p
(moz;CL)p
(moz;CL) +
p
(str; CL)
From now on, we will assume that c is su¢ ciently small, such that U() > 0 - i.e., it is
socially optimal for consumers to participate.
Discussion
Before turning to the analysis, we comment on the way we model consumer search. Since
this paper is the rst to formulate the search designproblem, we were guided by simplicity,
and opted for the simplest (and arguably most common) search protocol in the literature:
random sequential sampling from an innitely large pool of items. Important applications
of this protocol to consumer-market settings include Wolinsky (1986) and Armstrong et al.
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(2009). Thanks to this simplication, we can a¤ord not to sacrice generality in modeling
the novel friction at the heart of our paper, namely consumerslimited ability to describe
their needs. Modications of the search protocol that assume large nite pools or introduce a
small exogenous stopping probability (capturing search fatigue) would lead to very similar,
but less elegant characterizations.
The random-sampling assumption means that the planner is unable to control the order
by which consumers inspect products in their search pool. This is a reasonable assumption
for search environments in which inspection is done o­ ine. For instance, when a consumer
obtains a list of specialists from a Yellow Pagesdirectory, he can verify whether a specialist
is a good match only by physically contacting him. The order in which he will examine the
specialists will depend on their availability, which lies beyond the control of the directorys
planner. Even in the case of online search - where search results are ordered - the platforms
ability to control the order of inspection is imperfect. Athey and Ellison (2011) list a number
of reasons why web users may disobey the order in which links appear on their computer
screen: advertisers attract their attention away from prominent links; some links are slow or
broken; and they may distrust the motives behind the search engines suggested order. From
this point of view, our random-search assumption ts a worst-case analysis for the design of
search environments. We further discuss ordered search in Section 5.
Taking the random-sampling assumption as given, the social value of having innitely
many rms in search pools arises from our twin assumptions that  < 1 and that the
sampling process is with replacement. If we assumed that  = 1, there would be no need for
search pools to include more than one rm of each type. Likewise, if the random sampling
procedure were without replacement (an admittedly more realistic assumption), one could at
least construct examples in which a one-of-a-type pool dominates an innite pool. However,
an innite pool is socially optimal when sampling is with replacement.
Finally, consider our restriction that consumers make a single, ex-ante participation
decision. As long as  is su¢ ciently large, it is easy to extend our analysis to the case in
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which the consumer can revise his search decision after his type is realized (in particular, he
can choose to stop searching at any point); the results are essentially the same (the di¤erence
is that e¢ cient search pools may now exclude consumer and rm types). A deeper challenge
is that in reality, query-based search typically proceeds via successive alterations of the initial
query. The reason is that after encountering several items in the search pool, consumers get
a better sense of how they ought to describe their need, and consequently revise their query.
Constructing richer models of query-based search that incorporate this idea is an important
project for future research, even outside the context of search design.
II. Mechanism Design
We are interested in situations where only the consumer can verify whether a particular
product satises his need. Moreover, the only means of verication is personal inspection
via sequential search. In these situations, the planner cannot monitor the composition of
search pools. In order to design search pools with a particular composition, rms need to
be incentivized to enter the appropriate search pools.
A mechanism requires each rm to choose an element from some message space (the
rm can also opt out, in which case it earns 0). For every prole of messages, the mechanism
allocates rms probabilistically to the search pools associated with each w 2 W , and species
a (possibly negative) transfer that the rm pays to the planner. In addition, the mechanism
species a (possibly negative) transfer to consumers conditional on participation. The mech-
anism induces a simultaneous-move game, in which consumers choose (before their types are
realized) whether to participate, and each rm submits its message or opts out. Following
this game, consumers types are realized and they automatically submit their queries (if
they chose to participate), and the search pool associated with each query is induced by the
mechanism and rmsstrategies. The solution concept we use is symmetric Nash equilib-
rium - i.e., all consumers play the same strategy, and all rms of a given type play the same
strategy.
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In this section, we focus on direct mechanisms - i.e. the rmsmessage space is X.
We also restrict attention to anonymous mechanisms: the outcome for each rm is purely a
function of its own report and the overall distribution of rmsreports.
What can the planner monitor?
Our denition of direct mechanisms species lump-sum transfers that are independent
of events that unfold inside each search pool. Taken literally, this ts situations in which the
planner can only monitor whether rms access search pools. This is the case of a Yellow
Pages directory, for example. However, our specication is also consistent with the case
in which the planner can monitor impressions- i.e., he can condition the rms transfer
on the number of draws it receives in each search pool (online search engines fall into this
category). To see why, note that in our model rms are risk-neutral, hence all they care
about is the total number of transactions minus the total payment induced by any message
they submit. Therefore, our reduction to lump-sum transfers is a mere simplication that
carries no loss of generality.
Things are di¤erent when the planner can monitor transactions. This assumption is
sensible in environments like real-estate intermediation, where transactions are veriable
and subjected to exclusive-dealership arrangements. In our model, it would completely
trivialize the planners problem. By assumption, all rms earn a payo¤ of 1 conditional on a
transaction, regardless of the transacting partiestypes. Therefore, the planner could simply
set a uniform price-per-transaction of 1, and thus implement any outcome he wishes. It
follows that the interest in our problem arises only when the planner is unable to monitor
transactions.
A. Implementing E¢ cient Search Pools
In this sub-section we assume that the planners sole objective is to maximize social
surplus. He has an unlimited budget and can therefore satisfy the participation constraints
of consumers and rms. By the Revelation Principle, we assume w.l.o.g that conditional on
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participating, each rm truthfully reports its type in equilibrium. In addition, we restrict
attention to equilibria in which all rms choose to participate with probability one (we show
in the Appendix why this restriction is w.l.o.g). We are now able to reduce any anonymous
direct mechanism to the pair hq; T i = h(q(x;w))x2X;w2W ; (Tx)x2Xi, such that an individual
rm that reports x^ enters the search pool associated with w with probability q(x^; w), and
pays the transfer T (x^) to the planner.2 Because consumers have no private information at
the time they make their decision, we omit their transfer from the description and take it
for granted that it ensures their participation.
The planners problem is to nd an anonymous direct mechanism that sustains the
optimal collection of search pools  in symmetric Nash equilibrium. By the assumption
that all rms participate and report truthfully, the allocation rule q must satisfy
(4) (x j w) = q(x;w)P
y q(y; w)
for every (x;w) in the support of . It follows that the planners problem is to nd a
pair hq; T i that induces  according to (4), subject to the rms incentive compatibility
constraint: for every x; y 2 X,
(5)
X
w2W
q(x;w)  (x;w)
q(x;w)
  Tx 
X
w2W
q(y; w)  (x;w)
q(x;w)
  Ty
To understand this inequality, recall that when a rm of type x submits the report
x^, it enters the search pool associated with any query w with probability q(x^; w). Let us
calculate the number of transactions the rm expects in the pool. The total measure of
consumers at the pool who are interested in the rms type of product is (x;w). All of
these consumers eventually nd a desirable product; hence, they are equally shared by the
x rms in the pool. The total measure of these rms is q(x;w), by the assumption that all
rms participate and report truthfully. The number of transactions that the rm expects
to get in the pool associated with w is thus (x;w)=q(x;w). The rms total number of
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transactions is then calculated by summing over all consumer queries. To get the rms
payo¤, we subtract the transfer Tx^ induced by the rms report. Note that the rms net
equilibrium payo¤ is the L.H.S of (5), which is equal to (x)  Tx.
Plugging (1) and (4) into (5) and rearranging, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 1. An anonymous direct mechanism dened by hq; T i implements  in a symmetric
Nash equilibrium if and only if
(6) (x) 
X
w2W
p
(x;w)(y; w)  Tx   Ty
for every x; y 2 X.
We are now ready for our rst main result.
Proposition 2. There is an anonymous direct mechanism that implements  in symmetric
Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We prove a stronger result: the rst-best is implementable by independent mecha-
nisms for each w, as if W consisted of w alone. This result is stronger because we continue
to assume the same equilibrium behavior by rms (participation and truthful revelation)
and the same implemented outcome, but there are more constraints to satisfy (separate
participation and IC constraints for each signal, compared with single participation and IC
constraints in the grand mechanism).
Consider some w 2 W and some pair of product types x; y 2 X. When the relevant set
of signals is a singleton, fwg, the constraint that prevents type x from pretending to be y,
denoted IC(x; y), is given by the following inequality (derived from (6)):
(7) (x;w) 
p
(x;w)(y; w)  Tx   Ty
Let (x; y) denote the L.H.S. of (7), and rewrite IC(x; y) as (x; y)  Tx Ty. For any cycle
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of products (x1; x2; : : : xm; x1),
(x1; x2) +   + (xm; x1) =
mX
i=1

(xi; w) 
q
(xi; w)(x(i+1)modm; w)


mX
i=1

(xi; w)  (xi; w) + (x(i+1)modm; w)
2

= 0
Then, by Rochet (1987), there is a collection of transfers (Tx)x2X that satises IC(x; y) for
all x; y 2 X.
To illustrate the argument underlying the proof, let X = fx; yg, W = fwg. Suppose
the function q is designed to induce an e¢ cient search pool under truthful reports. If type x
reports truthfully, he gets (x) transactions. If he misreports, then by Lemma 1, the number
of transactions he will get is the geometric average of (x) and (y). The mutual incentive
compatibility constraints are then reduced to the requirement that the arithmetic average
of (x) and (y) is weakly greater than their geometric average, which is always true. In
the Appendix, we explicitly derive transfers that implement , using Vohras (2011) ow-
network technique.
B. Full Surplus Extraction and Bhattacharyya Similarity
In this sub-section we assume that the planner does not settle for maximizing social sur-
plus, but also wants to fully extract it. If the planner were a monopolistic, prot-maximizing
search platform, that would be its ideal outcome. Accordingly, we refer to the planners goal
in this sub-section as the perfect monopolists objective. We focus on the rmsbehavior
and take it for granted that the planner sets consumerstransfer such that their participation
constraint holds bindingly.
Before characterizing the implementability of this more stringent objective, we need to
introduce a new concept. When a rm contemplates misreporting its type, it realizes that it
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may be allocated to search pools associated with di¤erent queries. However, since consumers
queries are noisy signals of their needs, the rm may still get a fair number of transactions
despite its misallocation. Thus, the rms potential gain from misreporting depends on the
distinctiveness of the signal distributions that characterize consumer preference groups. It is
therefore useful to measure the similarity between the conditional query distributions ( j x)
and ( j y), for any given x and y. Of course, there are multiple ways to measure similarity
between probability distributions. However, one particular measure turns out to be relevant
for our exercise. For any pair of products x; y 2 X, dene
S(x; y) 
 X
w2W
p
(w j x)(wjy)
!2
In the statistics literature,
p
S(x; y) is known as the Bhattacharyya Coe¢ cient that
characterizes the distributions ( j x) and ( j y).3 From a geometric point of view, this
is an appropriate similarity measure, because
p
S(x; y) is the direction cosine between two
unit vectors (
p
(w j x))w2W and (
p
(w j y))w2W . The value of S(x; y) increases as the
angle between these two vectors shrinks; S(x; y) = 1 (0) if the two vectors are identical
(orthogonal). More importantly, the following observation establishes that S(x; y) is an
appropriate similarity measure given our interpretation of ( j x) and ( j y) as conditional
signal functions.
Remark 3. Regard the stochastic matrix (( j x))x2X as an information system in Black-
wells sense. When (( j x))x2X is subjected to Blackwell garbling, S(x; y) weakly increases
for all x; y.
Thus, Bhattacharyya Coe¢ cients decrease with the Blackwell-informativeness of con-
sumersqueries. This is consistent with the intuition that the distance between conditional
query distributions captures consumersability to describe their needs. In our Mozart vs.
Stravinskyexample, S(moz; str) = (CL j moz)(CL j str).
Our next result establishes a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the implementability
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of the perfect monopolists objective.
Proposition 4. There exists an anonymous direct mechanism that implements the perfect
monopolists objective if and only if
(8)
(x)
(y)
S(x; y)  1
for every x; y 2 X.
Proof. As pointed out in the discussion below (5), the net payo¤ of a rm of type x when
all rms report truthfully is (x)   Tx. Consider any x; y 2 X. Full surplus extraction
means that (x)   Tx = (y)   Ty = 0. Thus, IC(x; y), as given by (6), is reduced to
(y) p(x)(y)S(x; y), which is equivalent to (8).
Thus, the forces that obstruct the perfect monopolists objective are large popularity
gaps between products and uninformative signals. Consider two consumer preference types,
x and y. If x is signicantly more common than y in the consumer population, and the con-
ditional signal distributions that characterize x and y are relatively similar, then IC(x; y)
will fail to hold. In the Mozart vs. Stravinsky example, IC(moz; str) is violated when
(moz)=(str) is far from 1 and (CL) is large. At the other extreme, the perfect mo-
nopolists objective is implementable when the marginal of  over X is uniform (because
S(x; y)  1 for every x; y), or when consumerssignals are fully informative (because in this
case, S(x; y) = 0 for all x 6= y).
To get an intuition for condition (8), let X = fx; yg and (x) > (y), and let rms play
an equilibrium that sustains the rst-best. Now suppose that a rm of type x deviates by
pretending to be y. On one hand, the rms transfer to the planner drops from (x) to (y).
On the other hand, the rms probability of entering the search pool associated with any
w drops less in relative terms, because by (1) and (4), the ratio q(y; w)=q(x;w) is equal to
the square root of the ratio (y; w)=(x;w). Thus, there is a sense in which, relative to the
transfer rule, the allocation rule is biased in favor of the minority preference group, and this
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boosts the x rms incentive to deviate. If consumerssignals are su¢ ciently noisy, there
will be many consumers who want x in the search pools to which the rm is misallocated,
and IC(x; y) will be violated.
We saw that when the planner only cares about e¢ ciency, signal-by-signal implementa-
tion of his objective is possible. In contrast, for generic , signal-by-signal implementation
of the perfect monopolists objective is impossible. The reason is that in a single-query en-
vironment, S(x; y) = 1 for all x; y. Hence, Inequality (8) is violated by product types x; y
for which (x) > (y).
Prices per impression
The price-per-impression that a rm pays is the total transfer the rm pays to the
planner, divided by the total number of times it is drawn by consumers in search pools. In
any equilibrium that implements the perfect monopolists objective, the price-per-impression
of a rm is equal to its average conversion rate - i.e., the ratio of the total number of
transactions the rmmakes to the total number of draws it gets. The next result characterizes
this quantity.
Proposition 5. A direct anonymous mechanism that implements the perfect monopolists
objective induces the following price-per-impression for every product type x:
(9) p(x) =

p
(x)P
y
p
(y)S(x; y)
Bhattacharyya Coe¢ cients play an important role in this price function: p(x) increases
as the conditional query distribution that characterizes consumers who look for x becomes
more distinctive. The price-per-impression of all x is weakly increasing in the Blackwell
informativeness of consumersqueries.
To illustrate the comparative statics, suppose that X = W and that the marginal of
 over X is uniform. Consider two extreme cases. First, let (x j x) = 1 for all x - i.e.,
consumers can perfectly describe their needs. Then, p(x) =  for every x. Second, suppose
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 is uniform over X  X. In this case, consumerssignals are entirely uninformative, and
we have p(x) = = jXj for every x.
Finally, in the Mozart vs. Stravinskyexample,
p(str) =

1 +
p
(moz;CL)=(str; CL)
p(moz) =

1 +
p
(str; CL)=(moz;CL)
Note that p(moz) (p(str)) is an increasing (decreasing) function of the fraction of moz fans
among consumers who submit the query CL.
C. Uniform-Price Mechanisms
Suppose that the planner is not interested in extracting surplus. Instead, he wishes to
implement  using a mechanism in which transfers are independent of the rmsreports
- i.e., Tx = Ty for all x; y 2 X. In particular, the mechanism may be required to involve
no transfers at all. We refer to anonymous direct mechanisms that satisfy this additional
requirement as uniform-price mechanisms.
Proposition 6. There exists a uniform-price mechanism that implements  in symmetric
Nash equilibrium, if and only if (8) holds for every x; y 2 X.
Proof. Let x; y 2 X. Impose the uniform-price requirement Tx = Ty. Then, IC(y; x), as
given by (6), is reduced to (y)  p(x)(y)S(x; y), which is equivalent to (8). (Note
that the result follows from examining IC(y; x), whereas in the proof of Proposition (4) it
followed from examining IC(x; y).)
Thus, the condition for implementability of e¢ cient search pools by a uniform-price
mechanism is the same as the condition for implementability of the perfect monopolists
objective. To appreciate this coincidence, consider an abstract single-agent mechanism-
design setting with two agent types, 1 and 2, and two possible outcomes, O1 and O2. Suppose
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that the planners objective is to assign the outcome Ok to type k. The gross payo¤ of type
i from outcome Oj is denoted dij. Let tk denote the transfer the agent pays when he reports
his type to be k. The IC constraints that ensure truthful reporting are d11  t1  d12  t2 and
d22 t2  d21 t1. Full surplus extraction implies tk = dkk, and the IC constraints are reduced
to d22  d12 and d11  d21. Alternatively, uniform prices mean t1 = t2, and the IC constraints
are reduced to d11  d12 and d22  d21. Obviously, these systems of inequalities need not
coincide. And indeed, in general settings, the conditions for implementing an outcome with
full surplus extraction and with a uniform-price mechanism are di¤erent. However, if d12
and d21 happen to be the same, the two systems do coincide. This is precisely what happens
in our setting: we saw that under , the number of transactions that a rm of any type x
expects when it pretends to be any other type y is
P
w2W
p
(x;w)(y; w).
III. Competitive Bidding and Broad Matching
Is there a plausible indirect mechanism that implements the perfect monopolists ob-
jective when condition (8) holds for every x; y 2 X? We are particularly interested in
mechanisms based on competitive bidding, because they are natural benchmarks for object-
allocation mechanisms and commonly used by online search engines. Moreover, they shed
light on a key question: can competitive forcesgenerate e¢ cient search environments?
We propose a mechanism referred to as a broad-match auction. Each rm simulta-
neously chooses exactly one signal in W to bid for. Bids are per impression, according
to a rule we explain below. We introduce a broad-match function b : W W ! [0; 1] that
assigns to each signal v 2 W a measure b(w j v) of (w; v) ticketsfor every w 2 W . Each
of these (w; v) tickets is uniformly assigned to the rms that submitted the highest bid for
v. When a consumer submits the query w, he gets access to a search pool consisting of a
measure
P
v2W b(w j v) of (w; ) tickets, originating from all signals v via the broad-match
function. The consumer then sequentially samples random tickets from this pool. Each time
a consumer draws a (w; v) ticket, he incurs a search cost c and inspects the rm holding the
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ticket, and the rm pays to the planner the (winning) bid-per-impression it submitted for
v. As to the consumers transfer, assume it makes him indi¤erent to participation under the
e¢ cient allocation of rms to search pools.
From consumerspoint of view, the broad-match function plays the role of vocabulary
expansion. When a consumer submits the query w, he receives a search pool consisting of
ticketsthat originate from various signals v. Therefore, the broad-match function mimics
an environment in which the consumer has a richer vocabulary. Real-life intermediaries
regularly fulll this role, in order to generate matches that otherwise would not occur due to
the di¤erent language that parties on the two sides of the market use to describe themselves
or what they are looking for. Our innovation will be to show that when this role is explicitly
integrated into the design of the search platform, it can augment a conventional competitive-
bidding mechanism and go beyond its limitations.
The search process under the broad-match auction is slightly di¤erent from the descrip-
tion in Section 2, because here consumers repeatedly sample tickets rather than suppliers.
The conversion rate that a (w; v) ticket generates for the individual rm that holds it is the
probability that a consumer who draws the ticket will transact with that rm. The average
conversion rate that the signal v generates for an individual rm that submitted the highest
bid for v is the probability that a consumer who draws any of the (; v) tickets the rm holds
will transact with it.
The broad-match auction admits the possibility that all tickets in a search pool will be
held by a single rm. This possibility will not be realized in the equilibria we will analyze,
but it can occur o¤ the equilibrium path - e.g. when a single rm outbids all others for some
signal. The rms payo¤ in this case is ill-dened because it receives innitely many draws.
All we need to assume in this case is that if the conversion rate that the signal generates for
that rm is above (below) the rms bid, the rms payo¤ is arbitrarily high (low).
As a benchmark for our analysis, let us consider two extreme specications of b.
Exact matching
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Suppose that b(w j w) = 1 and b(w j v) = 0 for all w 6= v. In this case, we have
an exact-match auction: consumers who submit the query w are brought into contact
only with rms that submitted a winning bid for w. This reduces our mechanism to a
signal-by-signal rst-price auction. If consumerssignals were perfectly informative, it could
implement the perfect monopolists objective in symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.
The di¢ culty with exact matching arises when signals are noisy, such that optimal search
pools are required to be diverse. Consider the Mozart vs. Stravinsky example. If we
restrict attention to symmetric pure-strategy proles, exact matching only allows ( j CL)
to take the values 0; 1
2
; 1, and therefore it is mechanically unable to generate ( j CL) for
generic .
However, the di¢ culty with exact matching extends to mixed-strategy equilibria. Let
m(x) denote the measure of x rms in the CL search pool that is induced by some symmetric
(and possibly mixed) Nash equilibrium. Then,
(10)
m(moz)
m(str)
=
(moz j CL)
(str j CL)
In order for  to coincide with , it must be the case that m(moz) > 0 andm(str) > 0 - i.e.,
both moz and str rms must submit the winning bid for CL. In order for the rmssurplus
to be fully extracted, the winning bid must be equal to the conversion rate they expect at
CL. Therefore, they must expect the same number of transactions in the pool. This number
for an individual x rm is (x;CL)=m(x), because all consumers of type (x;CL) search and
eventually nd a product they like, and all x rms in the pool equally share this clientele.
Plugging (10), we obtain
(moz j CL)
(str j CL) =
(moz;CL)
(str; CL)
which contradicts the e¢ ciency condition (3).
Fully broad matching
Suppose that b(w j v) = 1 for all w; v. This reduces our mechanism to exact matching,
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dened for a ctitious environment that consists of one signal w, such that the fraction of
(x;w) consumers is (x). Therefore, fully broad matching is weakly dominated by exact
matching. In particular, there are distributions  for which the former fails to implement
the perfect monopolists objective while the latter succeeds. The reason is that fully broad
matching e¤ectively eliminates all the information contained in consumerssignals.
We now construct a broad-match function b that lies somewhere between the two
extremes of exact and fully broad matching. It will be convenient to present X as a subset
of W . This is more than a notational convenience: as in the Mozart vs. Stravinsky
example, it is natural to assume that the name of a product type is itself a possible query.
For every w; v 2 W ,
b(w j v) =
8><>:
p
(v; w) if v 2 X
0 if v =2 X
This broad-match function has a natural interpretation. The signals in W   X are
dummy keywordswith no value for bidders, because they grant no tickets to any search
pool. The signals in X are working keywordsworth bidding for. The strength of the broad
match from v = x to w increases with the fraction of (x;w) types among consumers.
Unlike the analysis in Section 3, here we are interested in characterizing the entire class
of symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibria in the game that is induced by the mechanism.
Note that there are trivial equilibria in which consumers choose not to participate. The
following result neglects these equilibria.
Proposition 7. Suppose condition (8) holds for every x; y 2 X. Then, the game induced by
the broad-match auction dened by b has a Nash equilibrium, in which all rms of type x bid
p(x) for the signal x, where p is given by (9). Moreover, for generic , this is the unique
symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium in which all consumers participate. In this equilibrium,
rms surrender their entire surplus to the planner, and the induced collection of search pools
is .
Thus, b addresses the incentive problem due to broad matching, to the extent possible
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given Proposition 4. On one hand, allocation of keywords to rms is based on competitive
bidding. In equilibrium, x rmsbid-per-impression for the working keywordx is equal
to their average conversion rate, such that their surplus is fully extracted. On the other
hand, b ensures that the consumers search pools are e¢ ciently diversied, given rms
equilibrium behavior. For this, it is crucial that b(w j x) is proportional to p(x;w). The
relation between the broad-match auction and the direct mechanism is quite transparent:
when a rm bids for x, it e¤ectively reports that this is its type, and the broad-match
function executes the role of the function q in the direct mechanism. As usual, however, the
indirect mechanism generates more potential deviations, and therefore verifying equilibrium
- let alone its essential uniqueness - is more intricate.
A rather restrictive feature of the broad-match auction is that rms are not allowed to
bid for more than one keyword. When we relax this restriction and allow rms to bid for
as many keywords as they wish, a weaker version of Proposition 7 holds: under the same
conditions, the modied mechanism admits a symmetric pure-strategy Nash equilibrium that
implements the perfect monopolists objective. However, there is potentially a continuum of
other equilibria, in which some rms earn positive prots.
Comment: Broad matching in sponsored ad auctions
Although our model borrows the term broad matchingfrom online search, it does not
mean quite the same thing, and we believe that the di¤erences are instructive. Historically,
broad matching was introduced in pursuit of two goals:4 (1) simplifying advertisersbidding
task, because under exact matching they need to bid for many keywords (involving typos
and semantically related terms); (2) thickening markets in order to raise auction revenues.
Both goals are supply-side oriented - broad matching was not designed with the vocabulary-
expansion role in mind. In practice, vocabulary expansion relies on explicit attempts by
the organicsearch engine (which coexists with sponsored search) to help users rene and
correct their queries. In our model, goals (1) and (2) are irrelevant: if the mechanism allowed
rms to bid for multiple keywords, it would be costless for them to do so; and since there are
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innitely many rms of each type, markets are already thick under exact matching. Finally,
in our model the design of consumerssearch environment is entirely decentralized, hence no
organicsearch engines can help consumers rene their queries. Thus, broad matching in
our model is exclusively a vocabulary-expansion instrument.
As to the way broad matching interacts with the auction design, our ticketsmechanism
di¤ers from real-life practice in two important qualitative dimensions. First, broad matching
is optional in practice: bidders can choose to stick with exact matching. Second, in our
model the winners in the auction for v are broad-matched with other queries w, whereas in
practice, broad matching means that whenever a rm bids for v and selects broad matching,
its bid enters auctions for other queries w. Despite these di¤erences, the idea that broad
matching mimics the vocabulary-expansion role of search intermediaries may be relevant to
future work on sponsored ad auctions.
In our broad-match auction, a rm of one type does not want to kick rms of an-
other type out of the market (by topping their bid), because this would ood the rm with
unwanted tra¢ cof consumers that do not generate any transactions. The possibility of
receiving many impressions with infrequent conversions is a real concern in online search
markets. As the following quote from Even Dar et al. (2009) shows, this concern is most
profound when relying on a search engines broad match: While giving more expressiveness
to advertisers, this feature makes it challenging to optimize bids to maximize their returns:
choosing to bid on a query as a broad match because it provides high prot results in one
bidding for related queries which may yield low or even negative prots.5 Of course, in our
stylized model the irrelevant tra¢ ctakes an extreme form (innitely many impressions),
but this motive would be present in some form in a more realistic model that allows for
search fatigueor consumer learning.
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IV. Concluding Remarks
This paper addressed the following general question: under what conditions can a de-
centralized mechanism be e¢ cient in helping individuals nd what they want? In most of
our discussion, we interpreted consumerssignals as keyword-based queries, and this linked
our model to the problem of search-engine design. In this context, our question could be
rephrased as follows: would a search intermediarys performance (measured in terms of prof-
its or social welfare) deteriorate if it switched from a centralized matching algorithm to a
decentralized mechanism?
However, our framework accommodates a wider range of environments, including ones
which have yet to establish an organized marketplace for allocating rms to search pools. For
example, online recommender systems give users access to search pools according to their
navigation history, which serves as an imperfect signal of their current needs. In contrast
to search engines, recommender systems do not purely rely on queries initiated by the web
user.6
To see how the broad-match auction of Section 4 ts the recommendation-system inter-
pretation, suppose thatW represents a set of possible past purchase proles of the consumer.
In particular, we can setW = XK , whereK is the number of past purchase opportunities the
consumer had. An element in W is a platform for personalized advertising, augmented by
broad matching: when an advertiser pays for a particular prole of past purchases, he poten-
tially gets access to other proles. In this context, our question can be rephrased as follows:
suppose that a recommender system abandons its centralized recommendation algorithm in
favor of a market for sponsored recommendations; will its performance deteriorate as a
result? Propositions 2 and 4 can be viewed as partial answers to this question.7
Ordered search pools
Suppose that the planner can perfectly control the order in which consumers inspect
search results. Thus, he can choose which type of rm the consumer will encounter at each
draw, as a function of his search history. The e¢ cient ordering of items in a search pool
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follows simple maximum likelihood: the product type displayed in the k-th position of a w
consumers list, denoted xk(w), is the most likely to be preferred by the consumer, given that
he rejected all the k 1 rms whose types are x1(w); : : : ; xk 1(w). This ordering can be easily
implemented because the rm type with the highest willingness to pay for the k-th position is
the one that is most likely to transact with the consumer, which is by denition xk(w). The
feature that trivializes the problem is the lack of substitutability between product types: if a
consumer wants x, he will never transact with y 6= x. Relaxing this assumption is necessary
for an interesting model with ordered search pools.
Related literature
We are not aware of precedents for our formulation of the search design problem.
One related body of work studies mechanisms for allocating sponsored links by online search
engines (e.g. Edelman et al. (2007)). Typically, the literature assumes that links have
exogenous values to advertisers. Athey and Ellison (2011) explicitly model how these values
are determined by consumersendogenous search decisions. Chen and He (2011) and Eliaz
and Spiegler (2011) model explicitly the interaction between keyword and product prices
(ignoring auction-theoretic considerations). This literature almost invariably assumes exact
matching; two exceptions are Dhangwatnotai (2011) and Chen et al. (2014). The rst
study uses the price of anarchy framework to analyze the performance of a mechanism
in which advertisers can submit a bid to multiple generalized second-price auctions at once.
The second paper analyzes the worst equilibrium of a mechanism that randomly samples
a keyword according to a predened probability distribution and only runs the generalized
second-price auction for this sampled keyword.
This paper is also related to the literature on intermediation in two-sided markets (see
Caillaud and Jullien (2001,2003), Rochet and Tirole (2003) and Armstrong (2006)). Some
works within this tradition (e.g. Hagiu and Jullien (2011)) explicitly address search plat-
forms. One can view the consumers signal in our model as a (sole) platform to which he has
access. In this context, broad matching can be viewed as a directed network of platforms:
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a consumer who is attached to one platform is able to interact with rms that attach them-
selves to another platform. The papers we are aware of implicitly assume exact matching:
interaction between a consumer and a rm requires that they are both attached to the same
platform.8
Finally, in the last decade there has been much writing, both academic and popular,
about the long tailphenomenon (see Brynjolfsson et al. (2006) or Anderson (2007)). In
many industries, a large segment of the consumer population consists of numerous small
taste niches. Online commerce facilitates the ourishing of the long tail, because it lowers
barriers to entry that characterize brick-and-mortar commerce. The key friction that re-
mains (indeed, becomes magnied) is consumerslimited awareness of products that t their
peculiar tastes, and their limited ability to describe these tastes in order to locate relevant
products on the internet. The long tailphenomenon means that search design can have
substantial welfare implications.
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A Appendix
A. An explicit direct mechanism for Proposition 2
We construct a mechanism for each signal w (independently of all other signals), using
Vohras (2011) graphical representation of IC constraints. Consider a weighted directed
graph, whose set of nodes is X, and the weight on the link x ! y is (x; y) = (x;w)  p
(x;w)(y; w). Add a link from any x to itself, whose weight is (x; x) = 0. A path from
x to y is a sequence of nodes that begins with x and ends with y. Dene the length of a path
to be the sum of the weights on the directed links along the path. Let (x; y) be the distance
from x to y, namely the length of the shortest path from x to y: Since the sum of weights
along any cycle is non-negative, the distance is always well-dened and non-negative, and
by denition it satises the triangle inequality: for any x; y; z, (x; z)  (x; y) + (y; z). Fix
some x 2 X. For any x 2 X, dene Tx = (x; x) L, where L > 0 is large enough to ensure
that rmsparticipation constraints hold. By the triangle inequality, (x; y) + (y; x) 
(x; x) for any x; y 2 X. This implies that for any pair of distinct products x; y in X,
(x; y)  Tx   Ty; hence IC(x; y) is satised.
Let us illustrate these transfers in the Mozart vs. Stravinskyexample. The problem
for the signalMOZ is trivial, because all consumers who submit this signal wantmoz. Thus,
the planner can prescribe Tmoz = " > 0 = Tstr, and if " is small enough, no rm would have
an incentive to opt out or misreport. An analogous argument holds for STR. Let us turn
to the mechanism associated with CL. Note that
(moz; str) = (moz;CL) 
p
(moz;CL)(str; CL)
(str;moz) = (str; CL) 
p
(moz;CL)(str; CL)
Set Tstr = 0 and Tmoz = (moz; str), and all participation and IC constraints will hold. 
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B. Remark 3
Denote (k j i) = ik, such that (ik) is a stochastic matrix with kik = 1 for every i.
Let
ik =
X
h
ihmhk
where (mhk) is a jW j  jW j bi-stochastic matrix. That it, (ik) is a Blackwell garbling of
(ik). Fix i; j. Then,
X
k
p
ikjk =
X
k
vuut X
h
ihmhk
! X
h
jhmhk
!
By the Cauchy-Schwarz inequality, this expression is weakly greater than
X
k
X
h
q
ihmhkjhmhk =
X
h
q
ihjh
X
k
mhk =
X
k
q
ikjk
Since this inequality holds for every i; j, it follows that
X
i
X
k
p
ikjk 
X
i
X
k
q
ikjk
which completes the proof. 
C. Proof that Proposition 4 extends to mixed participation decisions
When the mechanism fully extracts rmssurplus, they are indi¤erent to participation.
In our analysis, we restricted attention to equilibria in which all rms participate and report
truthfully. The latter is w.l.o.g by the Revelation Principle. However, it is not obvious
that insisting on full participation is w.l.o.g. Put di¤erently, can we relax condition (8) by
allowing rms to play a mixed participation strategy? Let (x) be the probability that a
rm of type x participates. A participating x rm has no incentive to report that its type is
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y if and only if
X
w2W
q(x;w)  (x;w)
(x)q(x;w)
  Tx 
X
w2W
q(y; w)  (x;w)
(x)q(x;w)
  Ty
which reduces to
(A1)
(x)
(x)
  Tx 
X
w2W
q(y; w)
(x)q(x;w)
 (x;w)  Ty
Because rms earn zero prots, Tx = (x)=(x) and Ty = (y)=(y). The ratio between
the measures of y and x rms in the pool associated with w is (y)q(y; w)=(x)q(x;w). Since
the equilibrium is required to induce e¢ cient search pools, this ratio equals (y j w)=(x j
w) =
p
(y; w)=(x;w). It follows that inequality (A1) can be written as
1
(y)
X
w2W
p
(y; w)p
(x;w)
 (x;w)  (y)
(y)
which is equivalent to condition (8). 
D. Proof of Proposition 5
In the rst-best outcome, all consumers who look for x eventually nd a product they
like, and they are equally shared by a measure one of x rms. Therefore, the number of
transactions that an individual rm of type x expects is (x). The number of draws it
obtains is equal to X
w
q(x;w)
X
y
(y; w)
  (y j w) 
1P
y q(y; w)
After we plug (2) and (4) into  and q, this expression becomes
1

X
y
p
(x)(y)S(x; y)
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The ratio between the number of transactions and the number of draws is the average
conversion rate experienced by x rms. Note that it is equal to p(x). Because rms earn
zero prots in the rst-best outcome, the average conversion rate is equal to the amount
that x rms pay on average per draw. 
E. Proof of Proposition 7
We break the proof into three parts.
Part 1: The strategy prole induces .
Recall there is a measure one of every rm type x 2 X. Since all x rms bid for x,
the measure of tickets held by x rms in the search pool associated with any w is b(w j x).
Therefore, for every w 2 W ,
(x j w) = b
(w j x)P
y b
(w j y) =
p
(x;w)P
y
p
(y; w)
= (x j w)
Part 2: The strategy prole constitutes a Nash equilibrium.
We make two preliminary observations. First, by the denition of p, rms earn zero
prots under the assumed strategy prole. Second, the strategy prole implies that if a
consumer who submits the query w draws a ticket held by an x rm, it must be a (w; x)
ticket. In other words, all the tickets held by x rms in the search pool associated with w
originate from the signal x. This means that if a rm of type y 6= x deviates by bidding
p > p(x) for x, it will hold all the (w; x) tickets in some search pool w for which (x;w) > 0.
As a result, consumers of type (x;w) will search indenitely without nding a product they
want, and therefore the y rm will get innitely many draws in the search pool associated
with w; the average conversion rate that the y rm will experience thanks to winning the
signal x will drop to zero, and the rms deviation will be unprotable.
In addition, no rm has a strict incentive not to participate or to bid for a dummy
signal. The former gives a payo¤ of zero, while the latter gives a payo¤ of at most zero
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(when the bid is zero).
It follows that the only deviations we need to examine are of two types: (I) a rm of
some type y submits p(x) for some signal x 6= y; (II) a rm of some type x changes its bid
for x to p > p(x). Consider type-I deviations. Because the deviation is by a non-atomic
rm that joins a measure-one set of highest bidders for x, there is a measure one of rms that
hold all (w; x) tickets both before and after the deviation. Therefore, all we need to do is
verify that submitting the winning bid for x generates fewer transactions for the deviating y
rm than it does for the x rms that bid for x. The number of transactions for the deviating
y rm is
(A2)
X
w
b(w j x)
1
 (y; w)
b(w j y)
because the rm gets b(w j x)=1 tickets to any pool associated with w. In every such
pool, there is a measure (y; w) of consumers who are interested in y. Every such consumer
eventually nds a product he wants, and this clientele is shared equally by all y rms in the
pool, the measure of which is b(w j y). By a similar calculation, the number of transactions
for an x rm is X
w
b(w j x)
1
 (x;w)
b(w j x) = (x)
We need this to be weakly greater than (A2). Plugging the denition of b, we obtain
(x) 
X
w
p
(x;w)(y; w)
which is equivalent to the inequality (8). Thus, the condition that prevents type-I deviations
coincides with the condition for general implementability of the planners objective, which
was assumed to hold at the outset.
Let us turn to type II deviations. Suppose that an x rm deviates by submitting a bid
p > p(x) for the signal x. The rm receives all the (w; x) tickets. However, both before
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and after the deviation, all (w; x) tickets are held by x rms. Therefore, the composition of
all search pools remains intact, and the number of transactions and draws per every (w; x)
ticket remains unchanged. It follows that the average conversion rate associated with the
signal x remains p(x), which is below the price-per-impression that the deviating rm pays.
Therefore, the rms deviation is unprotable.
Part 3: There are no other equilibria with full consumer participation.
We restrict attention to the generic case in which  has full support.9 Let us rst rule
out two cases.
Case 1 : The rms of at least one type x do not submit a winning bid for a working
signal. This means that consumers who look for x will never be serviced. As a result, their
net payo¤ conditional on participation is negative due to the innite search costs, and they
can protably deviate by opting out.
Case 2 : All rms submit a winning bid for some working signal, but there are two rm
types x and y that bid for the same signal v. Therefore, there must be a vacantworking
signal v0 that no rm bids for. Suppose that an individual x rm deviates by submitting
a bid of zero for v0. Because  has full support, b(w j v0) > 0 for every w. Prior to the
deviation, the signal v granted b(w j v) tickets for every w, and these tickets were allocated
uniformly to a population of rms of measure 2 at least. After the deviation, the deviating
x rm holds all the b(w j v0) tickets granted by v0. The deviating rm thus holds innitely
many more (w; ) tickets than prior to the deviation, for every w. As a result, it generates
innitely more transactions. Both before and after the deviation, all consumers eventually
nd a product they want, hence the number of draws that each consumer contributes is
nite. Finally, thanks to the deviation, the rm pays nothing per impression. Therefore, its
deviation must be protable.
It follows that any symmetric pure-strategy equilibrium in which all consumers partici-
pate is characterized by a permutation f : X ! X, such that all x rms bid for the working
signal f(x). Then, all rms must earn zero prots. Assume the contrary - i.e., rms of some
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type x submit a bid for f(x) which lies strictly below the conversion rate they experience at
f(x). Then, a standard Bertrandargument applies: an individual x rm can deviate to a
slightly higher bid for f(x), thus acquiring an innite number of tickets, at a slightly lower
net prot per ticket than prior to the deviation. It follows that in equilibrium, the winning
bid for each y 2 W  = X must be equal to the conversion rate experienced by the rms that
submit this bid.
Our objective is to show that the permutation f must be the identity function. Assume
the contrary. Then, there is a collection of rm types, x1; :::; xm; m  jXj, such that
f(xk) = xk+1modm. To sustain the equilibrium, it must be the case that no rm of type
k 2 f1; :::;mg would want to deviate by mimicking the winning bid for xk - i.e., mimicking
the equilibrium behavior of rms of type k 1 modm. If the rm did so, it would experience
the same number of draws as each of the rms whose behavior it mimics. Because all rms
earn zero prots prior to the deviation, this means that all we need to check is that the
deviating rm receives weakly fewer transactions.
In the putative equilibrium, each rm type x receives (x) transactions. The reason is
that all rms of a given type x submit a winning bid for f(x), and the full-support assumption
implies that all consumers who look for x eventually transact with one of these rms. Let us
calculate the number of transactions that a rm type y = f(x) would obtain if it deviated
by mimicking the behavior of x rms (i.e., mimicking their winning bid for y):
X
w
b(w j y)
1
 (y; w)
b(w j f(y)) =
X
w
(y; w)
p
(y; w)p
(f(y); w)
Thus, the condition that will prevent rms of type k = 1; :::;m from deviating by
mimicking the behavior of k   1 modm rms is
(A3) (xk 1modm) 
X
w
(xk; w)
p
(xk; w)p
(xk+1modm; w)
By assumption, the necessary condition for the implementability of the perfect monopolists
35
objective is satised. In particular, for every k; j,
(xk) 
X
w
q
(xk; w)(xj; w)
Adding up a suitable selection of these inequalities, together with the inequalities (A3), we
obtain the following condition:
2
mX
k=1
(xk) 
mX
k=1
X
w
(xk; w)
"s
(xk; w)
(xk+1modm; w)
+
s
(xk+1modm; w)
(xk; w)
#
For generic , the expression in the square brackets is strictly above 2, hence the inequality
is violated. 
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1We assume this symmetry purely for notational simplicity; it is easy to adapt our analysis
to the case of prot margins that vary across rm types.
2More generally, each rm is assigned a probability distribution over subsets of search
pools. However, because rms payo¤ is separable across search pools, it is w.l.o.g. to
associate with each report a probability distribution over individual search pools.
3See Basu, Shioya and Park (2011) and Theodoris and Koutroumbas (2008). A related
concept is the Hellinger distance between distributions, given by H2(x; y) = 1 pS(x; y).
4This historical account is informed by discussions with David Pennock (a pioneer of
sponsored-link auction formats, which employed broad matching) and Justin Rao. We are
grateful to them for sharing their knowledge and insights, and apologize for any imprecision
in this rendering.
5In a similar spirit, an account manager at Bing Ads writes in a blog post titled The
People vs. Bing Broad Matchthat one of the most common complaints levied against Bing
broad match is that "it drives irrelevant tra¢ c". See http://www.ppchero.com/the-people-
vs-bing-broad-match/
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6Netix automatically displays movie recommendations for its subscribers on its home-
page; when a consumer buys a particular product on Amazon, the checkout screen displays
recommended products, even though the consumer was not actively searching for these prod-
ucts; and when a researcher views a scholarly article on ScienceDirect, the side panel displays
links to other recommended articles.
7For a model of pricing of targeted ads, see Bergemann and Bonatti (2013).
8Some papers in the literature on two-sided markets have taken a mechanism-design
approach. Spiegler (2000) examines contract design by an intermediary who aims to match
agents who could interact elsewhere, and extract their joint surplus. Gomes and Pavan
(2014) study mechanisms for implementing e¢ cient many-to-many matching when agents
are privately informed about their "vertical" characteristics.
9This genericity requirement can be weakened, at the cost of having a considerably longer
proof.
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